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Abstract
This paper employs the Panzar and Rosse and the Bresnahan mod-
els to determine the level of competition in the South African banking
sector. This level of competition was tested during the period 1998 to
2008 for the Panzar and Rosse approach and from 1992 to 2008 for
the Bresnahan model. We nd evidence of monopolistic competition
in the South African banking sector. Our ndings are consistent with
those of Bikker et al (2012) for South Africa.
Jel classication: C33, D4, G21, L1
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1 Introduction
A competitive banking sector is important for the proper functioning of the
economy. Indeed, the banking sector is the cornerstone of any properly func-
tioning modern economy. At a micro level, banks, just like any other rms,
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sell products to consumers - hence we need to worry about e¢ ciency impli-
cations if the banking sector is not competitive. However, banks are much
more important than this at a macro level. Firstly, banks advance credit or
loans to both rms and consumers and thus an uncompetitive banking sector
will lead to an underprovision of such credit or loans (Claessens & Laeven,
2005). This may negatively impact the overall economic performance of the
country. Secondly, banks act as the primary conduit of monetary policy. To
this regard, a low level of competition in the banking sector may hamper the
e¤ectiveness of monetary policy as banks may not respond appropriately to
monetary tightening and/or easing (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008).1
It is for these and other reasons that the issue of determining the level of
competition in the banking sector has been a topic of interest to academics,
policy makers as well as the general public. Despite the importance of
such competition research, there has historically been very few studies of
the level of competition in the South African banking sector. Looking at
prior structural studies of the South African banking sector, authors such
as Falkena et al. (2004) and Okeahalam (2001) have generally concluded
that the sector is highly concentrated. This high level of concentration is
due to a few large banks dominating the market. Some economists believe
that a high level of concentration shows that the banking sector is su¤ering
from a low level of competition - the so-called structure-conduct-performance
paradigm. This paper is an attempt at a comprehensive study of the nature
of competition in the South African banking sector.
Many authors2 have given much criticism to using structural methods
when measuring competition in the banking sector. This paper therefore fo-
cuses on non-structural forms of measurement which takes into account that
banks behave di¤erently depending on the market structure in which they
operate (Baumol, 1982). The non-structural models used are the Panzar
and Rosse (1987) approach and the Bresnahan (1982) model. Our results
1 Indeed, Kot (2004), in his study of the interest rate pass-through in the new EU-
member states, nds that increases in the degree of competition in the banking sector
coincides with faster transmission of the monetary policy impulses to the consumer credit
prices.
2 Including Demsetz (1973); Berger (1995); and Mullineux & Sinclair (2000).
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suggest that the South African banking sector is monopolistic in nature. A
similar study by Bikker et al (2012) reaches a similar conclusion. Studies
that estimate scaled revenue equations such as Claessens & Laeven (2003)
tend to nd much higher levels of competition in the South African banking
sector a result of the upward bias in these models.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the various the-
ories and methods used to measure competition and gives an overview of
the South African banking sector. Section 3 discusses the Panzar and Rosse
approach in detail while section 4 provides the analysis and results of the
Bresnahan methodology. Section 5 makes a comparison of the results of this
paper to outcomes found in comparable developing countries and section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Banking Competition Theory
There have traditionally been two main methods for determining the level
of competition in the banking sector, namely tests on structural and non-
structural characteristics of banks.
The structural tests focus on characteristics such as the level of concen-
tration in the industry, the number of banks, market share, etc (Bain, 1951).
There are two main structural theories, the structure-conduct-performance
(SCP) framework and the e¢ ciency hypothesis (EH) (Bikker & Haaf, 2001).
The SCP framework says that in highly concentrated markets, banks use
market power to increase prots through higher loan prices and lower de-
posits rates - leading to a low level of competition (Bain, 1951). This is a
commonly used structural test for competition.
There are many criticisms to the SCP framework. One theoretical criti-
cism was originally put forth by Demsetz (1973) and later by Berger (1995).
They postulate that, contrary to the SCP approach, the larger market shares
which lead to a high level of concentration, are a result of better e¢ ciency
and lower costs rather than a low level of competition. Other arguments
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against the use of concentration as a measure of the level of competition
includes the theory introduced by Mullineux & Sinclair (2000). They ar-
gue that although higher concentration may lead to higher prices, and as
a result lower demand, it does not necessarily result in higher prots for
a highly concentrated banking sector. Indeed, the modern (New Empirical
Industrial Organization (NEIO)) view is that both industry structure and
industry performance are endogenous - being driven by some other factors.
As Schmalensee (1989) puts it, ...except in textbook competitive markets,
derived market structure is clearly a¤ected by market conduct in the long
run(p. 954). The NEIO thus does not assume a causal relationship be-
tween market structure and performance, but rather, the approach tests
competition and the use of market power (Bikker & Haaf, 2002: 21; Bres-
nahan, 1989).
The most commonly used non-structural models in banking sector stud-
ies are the Panzar and Rosse approach (Rosse & Panzar, 1977; Panzar &
Rosse, 1987) and the Bresnahan model3 (Bresnahan, 1982).4 These models
recognise that banks behave di¤erently depending on the market structures
in which they operate (Baumol, 1982). They also do not ignore the relation-
ship between market contestability and revenue behaviour at the rm level,
which the structural methods do (Perera et al., 2006).
2.2 Overview of the South African Banking Sector
In the recent Banking Enquiry carried out by the Enquiry Panel of the Com-
petition Commission (Jali et al., 2008), it was concluded that the South
African banks were not acting as a cartel.5 Despite this, the panel also
believes that the cost and trouble involved for customers to switch banks
weakens the competitive e¤ect of price di¤erences between banks. They
stated that this allows supra-competitive pricing to be maintained. (Jali
3Added to by Lau (1982).
4The third model, the Iwata model (Iwata, 1974), is less utilised due to its rigid data
requirements (Perera et al., 2006). The Bresnahan model is an improved version of the
Iwata model and has been used in numerous studies.
5This conclusion is arrived at based on qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) analyses
of the banking sector.
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et al., 2008. p.28). The Competition Commissions Enquiry Panel therefore
suggests that although there is competition in the banking sector, there is
still need for intervention in certain aspects of the banksconduct. They rec-
ommend that banks should have to ensure greater transparency and disclose
product and pricing information; reduce search costs and improve compara-
bility between products; and reduce the actual cost of switching and assist
consumers in doing so. This would result in greater ease for customers to
switch between banks and prevent them from being locked in once they have
joined a bank. The panel believes that this will in turn raise the level of
competition in the banking sector. There is no guarantee of this improve-
ment in competition though. Increasing the market transparency on the
products and prices o¤ered by banks may actually help facilitate collusion
in the market (See for instance Tirole, 1988).6
Table 1 below shows how important the South African banking sector is
to the economy.
Table 1 about here.
The table illustrates that banks in South Africa play an important role
as major lenders, especially to the private sector. They also receive a huge
amount of deposits. They therefore play an important role towards the
facilitation of the credit process.
In the banking sector, the measure of market share can be approximately
calculated by the banks total assets (a proxy for total loans) or total deposits
as a percentage of industry totals. It can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 below
that the total deposits and total assets in 2007 are dominated by the four
main banks, Standard Bank, Firstrand, Nedbank and ABSA. These four
banks have market share in excess of 90%. This high market share should
potentially allow them to partake in collusive practices, raising their lending
6A case where increased market transparency was harmful to competition is the famous
case in Danish Cement industry whereby the competition authority decided to intervene
to enhance the competition by requiring a daily price list (for two grades of ready-mixed
concrete) to be revealed but this had an adverse e¤ect on the competition and rather
encouraged collusion. The requirement to publish a price list resulted in substantially
reduced price dispersion and average prices of reported grades increased by 15 - 20 percent
within one year (Albaek, Mollegard and Overgaard, 2003).
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rates and lowering their deposit rates.
Table 2 about here
Table 3 about here
The South African banking sector has a total of 22 registered banks
including locally owned banks, foreign owned banks and mutual banks (Re-
serve Bank, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). It can be seen that the majority of the
banks hold a very small portion of the market share. The South African
banking sector can therefore be characterised as highly concentrated (Okea-
halam, 2001).
2.3 Prior South African Banking Competition Research
Okeahalam (2001) attempts to measure the level of competition in the South
African banking sector by means of analysing the concentration in the in-
dustry. Okeahalam (2001) follows the structure-conduct-performance (SCP)
framework7 and concludes that the South African banking sector is highly
concentrated - which normally leads to a high likelihood that there will be
a collusive oligopoly in the industry.
Another study of the concentration in the South African banking sector
was carried out by Falkena et al. (2004) as part of a Task Group Report
for The National Treasury and the South African Reserve Bank. They used
various methods including the Herndahl-Hirschman Index to determine
the concentration in the sector. They concluded that there was in fact high
concentration in the South African banking sector, but that The high cost
and lack of access to banking services for small and micro-enterprises may
have more to do with a number of structural factors than [to] the level of
competition in banking.(Falkena et al., 2004. p.151).
Claessens & Laeven (2003) use the Panzar and Rosse approach to mea-
sure the level of competition in the banking sector of fty countries across
the world for the period 1994 to 2001. The South African banking sector
7See also Berger & Hannan (1989) and Okeahalam (1998).
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was included in their study. They found that the South African banking
sector faces a high level of competition. The methodology of Claessens &
Laeven (2003) however su¤ers from incorrect specication which tends to
result in an upwardly biased H-statistic (Bikker et al, 2012). Bikker et
al (2012) examine the nature of competition in the banking sectors of 63
countries (including South Africa) for the period 1994 - 2004. They nd
evidence consistent with imperfect competition.
This paper adds to the study of Claessens & Laeven (2003) by testing
the level of competition using the Panzar and Rosse approach for a longer
period (1998 to 2007), and using the specication proposed by Bikker et al
(2012), as well as using a second model, the Bresnahan model.
3 The Panzar and Rosse Approach
3.1 Methodology
3.1.1 The Theoretical Model
The rst approach we use for measuring competition in the South African
banking sector is the Panzar and Rosse Approach - Rosse and Panzar (1977)
and Panzar and Rosse (1987). This approach measures competition on panel
data by comparing the properties of each banks reduced form revenue equa-
tion across time. Two of the important assumptions underpinning this model
are (i) that banks operate in their long run equilibrium and (ii) that all banks
hold a homogeneous cost structure.8
This model measures the level of competition by establishing how each
of the individual banks revenues react to proportionate changes in input
prices. If the banks act as monopolies or at least in a monopolistic manner,
and face positive marginal costs, they will produce where demand is elastic.
An increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, causing equilibrium
output to decrease and equilibrium price to increase. Given that their elas-
ticity of demand is greater than unity, the increase in prices will result in a
8However, the long run equilibrium hypothesis is not a prerequisite when testing for
monopoly (Panzar and Rosse (1987: 446)).
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reduction in the total revenue of the bank. This reduction in revenue reveals
that banks are acting in an anticompetitive manner.
In a perfectly competitive environment however, an increase in input
prices leads to a rise in both marginal and average costs, with no change
in the optimal output for the individual banks.9 Theoretically, some banks
should exit the market, allowing the demand faced by the remaining banks
to increase. This should result in a proportionate increase in prices and rev-
enues. The percentage increase in revenues should be exactly equal to the
percentage increase in marginal costs in the case of a perfectly competitive
market (Bikker & Haaf, 2002). However, as shown by Bikker et al (2012), if
rms face constant average costs, it is possible that revenues will decrease
following an increase in input prices  negatively impacting the discrimi-
nating power of the P-R methodology. Should the industry environment be
that of monopolistic competition, the revenue will still increase by the same
mechanism as in perfect competition, but by not as much as the marginal
cost. The more competitive the market, the more the revenues will increase
as a result of an increase in input prices.10
By maximising prots at both the individual bank and industry level,
the equilibrium output and equilibrium number of banks can be found. At
the bank level, marginal revenues must equal marginal costs in order to
maximise each banks individual prots, therefore
R0i(xi; n; zi)  C 0i(xi; wi; ti) = 0;
where R0i and C
0
i are the marginal revenue and marginal cost of bank i
respectively. The marginal revenue of bank i is a function of their output
(xi) and a vector of variables that shift their revenue function exogenously
(zi), as well as the number of banks (n). The marginal cost of bank i is a
function of their output, a vector of m factor input prices faced by the bank
9This hinges on the assumptions of linear homogeneity of the cost function and long
run equilibrium.
10This however must be qualied as the cost structure may disallow full pass-through of
input prices to revenues even for rms in long-run competitive equilibrium, as shown by
Bikker et al. (2012). Thus the extent of pass-through is not necessarily that informative
regarding the nature of competition.
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(wi), and a vector of variables that shift their cost function exogenously (ti).
Furthermore, in order to determine the optimal number of banks,11 the
zero prot constraint must also hold at the industry level. Therefore
Ri (x
; n; z)  Ci (x; w; t) = 0;
where the superscript * denotes equilibrium values.
Panzar and Rosse have dened an H -statistic as the sum of the elasticity
of the banks revenue with respect to a change in each of m factor input
prices. The H -statistic is therefore
H =
mX
k=1

Ri
wki
 wki
Ri

;
where Ri is the equilibrium revenue for bank i and wki is the input price of
factor k for bank i.
The H -statistic derived by Panzar and Rosse is positively related to the
level of competition in the banking sector. The interpretation of the H-
statistic is a bit complicated however, in the sense that several situations
may arise. For instance, H  0 may indicate either monopoly behaviour, a
cartel, prot maximising oligopoly conduct or short run competition (Bikker
et al, 2012). Therefore, a nding of H < 0 on its own does not have discrim-
inating power. H = 1 suggests either perfect competition (long run compet-
itive equilibrium), sales maximisation subject to a break-even constraint, or
a sample of natural monopolies under contestability12; and 0 < H < 1 indi-
cates monopolistic competition (Claessens et al. 2004). However, as noted
by Sha¤er (2004; p.297), and further developed by Bikker et al (2012), out-
side of long run competitive equilibrium, the value ofH carries an ambiguous
interpretation.13 While Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that H is a decreas-
11 If this condition does not hold at the industry level, banks will realise potential prots
(losses) and enter (leave) the market until the equilibrium number of banks is obtained.
This zero prot constraint holds at this equilibrium.
12 Ibid.
13Bikker et al. (2012) show in their Proposition 3.6 that H < 1 or even H < 0 is
possible for rms in long-run competitive equilibrium with constant average costs (p. 13).
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ing function of the Lerner index for a pure monopoly, Sha¤er (1983) show
that H is an increasing function of market power for an oligopolist facing
xed demand. Thus, outside of the long run competitive equilibrium where
rms face U-shaped average costs, the sign of H is more informative than
the value of H:
3.1.2 The Empirical Model
The theoretical model described above has been interpreted by many authors
in di¤erent ways. This paper will follow the methodology of Bikker et al
(2012). The reduced form revenue equation is
ln INTR = + ( lnAFR+  lnPPE +  lnPCE) +  lnBSF
+ lnOI + e; (1)
where INTR is total interest revenue; AFR is the ratio of annual interest
expenses to total balance sheet; PPE is the ratio of personnel/sta¤ expenses
to total balance sheet; PCE is the ratio of physical capital expenditure and
other expenses to xed assets; BSF are Bank Specic Factors (loans to total
assets and equity to total assets); OI is the ratio of other income to the total
balance sheet; and e is the stochastic error term.14
Given this structure of the reduced form revenue equation, theH -statistic
can be represented as  +  + .
3.1.3 Data
All of the data are available from individual banksannual reports and -
nancial statements. A list of registered banks in South Africa was obtained
from the South African Reserve Bank. These registered banks include locally
controlled banks (Reserve Bank, 2008a); foreign controlled banks (Reserve
Bank, 2008b); and mutual banks (Reserve Bank, 2008c). Of these 22 regis-
tered banks, a number of them are in the process of liquidation. Others are
See also their Table 2.
14For the theoretical priors, see Bikker et al (2012).
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not listed on the JSE Securities Exchange, making attainment of the key
variables di¢ cult. Of the registered banks included in this study, some of
the years annual reports and nancial statements are not available or do not
disclose all of the key variables. Some of the banks therefore have missing
years in the dataset used - reducing the number of observations. Given that
this is panel data, the few missing observations do not signicantly impact
the results of this model.
The annual reports and nancial statements were obtained from McGre-
gor BFA while other data were obtained from the South African Quarterly
bulletin Money and Banking (various issues). The dataset was made up
of data from fourteen banks over the period 1998 to 2008. With missing
data from some banks in some of the time periods, the panel regression
includes 114 observations. We only consider the South African portion of
the banksoperations. As Sha¤er (2001, 2004) pointed out, this may in-
troduce biases to the estimated conduct parameter if a substantial portion
of banking business comes outside of the country or important competitors
are omitted from the estimation. In South Africa however, the portion of
banking business coming from outside the country is quite small which
would reduce the potential for bias.
The BSF variable includes bank specic exogenous factors. These bank
specic factors are other explanatory variables that reect di¤erences in
risks, costs, size and structure of banks (Bikker & Haaf, 2002). In this study
we use two bank specic ratios: Equity to Total Assets (BSF-EQ) and Loans
to Total Assets (BSF-LO).15 The inclusion of the non-performing loans ratio
reduces the sample size to half. It was decided that the benet of this gain
in a control variable does not outweigh the loss of power of the model. This
variable was therefore excluded from the regression.
15Bikker and Haaf (2001) used, in addition to the risk component, the di¤erences in
deposit mix control and the divergent correspondent activities control. However, due to
the unavailability of data, these variables cannot be computed for South Africa.
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3.2 Empirical Results
We estimate the unscaled revenue equation as proposed by Bikker et al.
(2012) using the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) method. Total
interest income is regressed on bank input prices (price of deposits (AFR),
wage rate (PPE), and price of capital (PCE)), and control variables (credit
risk (BSF-LO), leverage (BSF-EQ), and other income (OI)). We rst esti-
mate the unscaled revenue equation as given in (1) above. The results are
reported in Table 4a. The coe¢ cient on the average funding rate is negative
(-0.134) but insignicant, the wage rate is positive (0.50) and signicant at
the 5% level; the price of physical capital is also positive (0.32) and signi-
cant at the 5% level. All the control variables are signicant and the signs
are consistent with the theory. In particular, BSF-LO is positive, suggesting
that a higher loans to total assets ratio raises interest income, BSF-EQ car-
ries a negative sign, indicating that lower leverage reduces interest income,
and OI has a negative impact on interest income as expected. The associ-
ated P-R statistic which is given by the summation of the input elasticities
is given by H = 0:69.
Table 4a about here.
A concern raised in Bikker et al (2012) is that even though the estimated
equation is an unscaled equation, there are implicit scale e¤ects as some of
the right hand variables such as BSF-LO and BSF-EQ have total assets as
a denominator. To address this concern, we check for correlations between
these implicitlyscaled variables and total assets. We then regress interest
income on the explanatory variables, but correcting all explanatory variables
for scale (i.e., replacing the explanatory variables with residuals (Bikker et
al (2012; p. 24))).16 This constitutes our preferred model. We report the
16We also ran another regression where only AFR was not corrected for scale as it had
a correlation of 0.39 which is below the cut-o¤ of 0.48 as used in Bikker et al (2012). In
this case we found an an H statistic of 0:61:
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results in Table 4b.17
Table 4b about here.
Again, we nd that AFR is insignicant, while PPE is signicant at the
5 percent level and carries a positive sign as expected, PCE is signicant at
the 10 percent level, but carries a negative sign suggesting that an increase
in capital expenses lowers interest income for banks in South Africa. Both
BSF-LO and BSF-EQ are insignicant at the 10 percent level while OI is
signicant at the one percent level and carries a negative sign as expected
from theory indicating that as banks increase their share of non-interest
earning assets, interest income decreases. Summing the input price elastic-
ities yields an H statistic of 0:53, which is lower than in the uncorrected
regression suggesting the upward bias e¤ect of the "implicit" scale factors.
We test the following three null hypotheses: (i) H0 : AFR + PPE +
PCE  0; (ii) H0 : 0 < AFR + PPE + PCE < 1; and (iii) H0 :
AFR+PPE+PCE = 1 to determine the nature of competition in the South
African banking sector. These three hypotheses test for monopoly/oligopoly/cartel
or short run competitive equilibrium; monopolistic competition; and long-
run competitive equilibrium /contestable monopolies or sales maximisation
subject to break-even constraint respectively (Bikker et al (2012)). The null
hypothesis H0 : AFR + PPE + PCE  0 is rejected at the 5 percent level,
with a positive t-value of 2.38 (one tailed test). Monopoly/oligopoly/cartel
or short run competitive equilibrium is thus rejected for the South African
baking sector. The null hypothesis H0 : AFR + PPE + PCE = 1 is also
rejected at the 5% level (p = 0:019), implying that the H -statistic is sta-
tistically di¤erent from one (more precisely, smaller than unit, as it is a
one-tailed test). However, without information on the cost structure of the
banking sector, there is not su¢ cient information for us to conclude that
long run competitive equilibrium is rejected. We also tested for the null
hypothesis of monopolistic competition, H0 : 0 < AFR+PPE+PCE < 1;
and we cannot reject this null hypothesis. We thus conclude that the South
17We also conducted a ROA test to test whether or not the observations are in long run
equilibrium. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of long-run equilibrium.
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African banks face monopolistic competition.
The result of this application of the Panzar and Rosse approach reveals
that, with regard to interest income, the South African banking sector is
monopolistic in nature. Thus banks appear to posses some degree of market
power, but do not operate as absolute monopolies. The results of our
study are relatively similar to the ndings of Bikker et al (2012) who nd
an H statistic of 0:46 for South Africa.18
That personnel costs signicantly explain interest income is interesting.
There are debates currently in South Africa around nancialisation of the
economy. Concerns are that the nancial sector is growing too fast, and at
the expense of other sectors, as it has been able to attract skills from other
sectors through its ability to pay higher wages. The high degree of concen-
tration and the and the high switching costs and complex bank products
help explain the monopolistic outcome (Jali et al (2008)). Indeed, despite
the high concentration, non-price competition appears to be signicant, for
example, advertising.
4 The Bresnahan Model
4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 The Theoretical Model
The second model that is used to measure competition in the South African
banking sector is the Bresnahan Model (Bresnahan (1982)). This is a non-
structural test for the degree of competitiveness, such that this model can
be used even when there is no cost or prot data available. This can be
done by using industry aggregate data to measure this competition.
The idea behind this model is to see how price and quantity react to
changes in exogenous variables - revealing the degree of market power of the
average bank, and hence the level of competition in the banking industry.
18A caveat is in order. As discussed on pages 9-10, any value of H di¤erent from 1 is
di¢ cult to interpret as di¤erent levels of market power are consistent with such values. See
for instance, Sha¤er (2004); Bikker et al (2012). In particular, the relationship between
H and the degree of competition is non-monotonic.
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The prot function for the average bank takes the form of
i = pxi   ci(xi; EXS)  Fi;
where i is prot; xi is the quantity of output of the bank; p is the output
price; ci are the variable costs; and Fi are the xed costs faced by bank i.
The variable costs are a function of the output of the bank, as well as the
exogenous variables that a¤ect marginal costs, but not the industry demand
function (EXS).
The inverse of the demand function faced by the banks is
p = f(X;EXD) = f(x1 + x2 + : : :+ xn; EXD);
such that prices are a function of exogenous variables that a¤ect the industry
demand but not the marginal cost (EXD) and each of the n banksoutputs.
The rst order conditions for prot maximization of bank i is
di
dxi
= p+ f 0(X;EXD)
dX
dxi
xi   c0(xi; EXS) = 0:
Summing over all banks gives
p+ f 0(X;EXD)
dX
dxi
1
n
X   c0(xi; EXS) = 0;
such that
p =  f 0(X;EXD)X + c0(xi; EXS); (2)
where  is the measure of the level of competition in the banking sector and
is equal to
 =
dX
dxi
1
n
=

1 +
d
P
j 6=i xj
dxi

1
n
:
In this case,  is a function of the conjectural variation19 of the average rm
in the market(Bikker & Haaf, 2001). In a perfectly competitive industry,
an increase in the output of bank i should result in a decrease of all other
19Conjectural variation is the change in output of the other banks, anticipated by bank
i as a response to an initial change in its own output.
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banksoutputs totalling the same magnitude as the initial increase in bank
is output. Thus  =

1 +
d
P
j 6=i xj
dxi

1
n = (1   1) 1n = 0, irrespective of the
number of banks, n. If there is perfect collusion in the industry, an increase
in bank is output will result in an equal increase in the output of all the
other banks in the industry. This means that
d
P
j 6=i xj
dxi
= X xixi and as a
result  = Xxin = 1. For a single monopolist, there are no other banks in
the industry and thus
d
P
j 6=i xj
dxi
= 0. Therefore  = 1n where n = 1, from
which  = 1. Under the usual assumptions, these are the two extreme values
of  corresponding to opposite levels of competition in the industry. The
conduct parameter  is restricted between 0 and 1, and is proportional to
the level of competition in the industry.
4.1.2 The Empirical Model
As is standard in the literature, we consider deposits as an input rather than
an output of the bank. We consider the banks output to be loans, and the
demand for loans is given by,
Q = 0 + 1P + 2EXD + 3EXDP + ; (3)
where Q is the real value of total assets (a proxy for loans) in the industry
(used to measure banking services or output); P is the price of the banking
services; EXD are the exogenous variables that a¤ect industry demand for
banking services, but not the marginal costs - including disposable income,
number of bank branches and interest rates for alternative investments (the
money market rate and the government bond rate); and  is the error term.
The interaction terms EXDP are included to ensure the identiability of the
conduct parameter, :Without the interaction terms, one cannot distinguish
competition from monopoly (Bresnahan 1982: 152-153).
On the supply side, Bikker and Haaf as well as Sha¤er (1993) postulate
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the following marginal cost function:20
MC = 0 + 1InQi +jj lnEXSj ; (4)
where MC is the marginal cost for each bank; EXS are the exogenous
variables that inuence the supply of loans, including the cost of input fac-
tors for the production of loans - wages, deposit rate and price of physical
capital. The cost function as specied, is a legitimate marginal cost function
as it satises all the requisite properties.
Rearranging the demand function yields,
P =
1
1 + 3EXD
[Q  0   2EXD   ] : (5)
The total revenue for each bank can be obtained by multiplying the above
rearranged demand equation by bank is output, Q,
TRi =
1
1 + 3EXD
[Q  0   2EXD   ]Q: (6)
Di¤erentiating this total revenue with respect to bank is output will give
the banks marginal revenue,
MRi =
dTRi
dQi
=
1
1 + 3EXD
[Q  0   2EXD   ]
+
1
1 + 3EXD
dQ
dQi
Qi
= P +
n
1 + 3EXD
Qi: (7)
Equating the marginal revenue and marginal cost of each bank to obtain the
market equilibrium,
P +
n
1 + 3EXD
Q = 0 + 1 lnQ+jj lnEXSj + vi: (8)
20There is no requirement that the "true" marginal cost be linear. We can view (4) as
a linear approximation of the marginal cost function.
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Rearranging and averaging to obtain the supply of loan facilities by the
banks yields:
P =   Q
1 + 3EXD
+ 0 + 1 lnQ+jj lnEXSj + v: (9)
Equations (3) and (9) constitute a system of two equations which we need
to estimate to determine the  statistic.21 We thus have a simultaneous
equation system and because of the possible endogeneity problem, equations
(3) and (9) are estimated simultaneously to identify :
4.1.3 The  Statistic
This coe¢ cient  is the value that determines the level of competition in
the banking sector. Specically,  indexes the degree of market power of the
average bank (Sha¤er, 2001). If  = 0; the outcome is competitive while  =
1 if the outcome is perfectly collusive. For  2 (0; 1) ; the banking market
is imperfectly competitive, and allows for all forms of oligopoly behaviour
(see Sha¤er (2001) for further explanations).
The estimated equations are:
Q = a0 + a1P + a2gdp+ a3Pgdp+ a4govt_r + a5Pgovt_r + ; (10)
P =
 Q
a1 + a3gdp+ a5govt_r
+b0+b1 lnQ+b2 lnwage+b4 ln r+b5 ln pce+v;
(11)
where Q is the quantity of banking services measured as the dollar value
of total assets and P is the pricing of banking services measured by the
interest rate earned on the assets; gdp is the real gross domestic product,
govt_r is the 3 month government treasury bill rate, Pgovt_r and Pgdp
are interaction terms; wage is the average real wage in banking sector and
r is the deposit rate and pce is the price of physical capital. The variable,
Q 1a1+a3gdp+a5govt_r is the conduct variable and its coe¢ cient,  , is the
parameter of interest. The parameters  and v are the respective error terms.
21 Identication of  requires that both 1 6= 0 and 3 6= 0 holds.
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The specication of the  parameter implicitly assumes that banks are
input-price takers which is plausible for labour and physical capital since
in South Africa banks compete with other rms for labour and capital. For
deposits however, the case may be di¤erent. It is possible that the deposit
rate may be exogenous, if there is sti¤ competition for deposits (Sha¤er,
1993, 2004). In that case the above assumptions still hold and banks would
still be input price-takers even when it comes to deposits. However if banks
have market power in deposits then the  as specied in the model may over-
state the degree of market power and thus be biased against the competitive
case (Sha¤er, 1993).
4.1.4 Data
The data required for the Bresnahan model are all macroeconomic (industry
level) time series variables. Macroeconomic data is generally easier to obtain
than microeconomic data. This is one of the benets of using the Bresnahan
model versus models that use bank specic data such as the Panzar and
Rosse approach. In the case of a developing country such as South Africa
however, this data is not always readily available. For example, there is
not su¢ cient data to enable us to test directly competition for the loans
market. Following Sha¤er (1993) we use the value of total assets as a proxy
for output since we do not have su¢ cient information on loans.
Unfortunately, historical unemployment data is not readily available for
South Africa. The longest range was available from the International Mon-
etary Funds International Financial Statistics (IFS) database which con-
tained quarterly data from Q1 of 1992 until Q4 of 2008. This dataset has a
two year gap from Q1 of 1998 until Q4 of 1999. This therefore would restrict
the study to 57 periods. Since our sample is already small, we decided to
drop the unemployment variable from the sample in order to raise the num-
ber of observations. Most of the remaining variables were also obtained from
the IFS database. The banking sector wage variable was obtained from the
South African Reserve Bank online database. Disposable income data was
only available annually from the South African Reserve Bank database. Im-
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puting quarterly values would result in inaccurate data, therefore a proxy
for the disposable income was used. The best proxy would be the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) at constant 2000 prices. This is because the dis-
posable income is calculated from the GDP by subtracting aggregate taxes
from this value.22 There was insu¢ cient time series data on the number of
bank branches, therefore this variable was excluded from this study.
4.2 Empirical Results
The quantity of banking services is determined by the price of banking
services and exogenous variables such as GDP and government treasury bill
rate. The price coe¢ cient should be consistent with a downward-sloping
demand curve. The government debt rate, being a price of a substitute,
should have a negative coe¢ cient. GDP proxies for income and it is expected
to be positive.
The supply equation (9) determines the price of banking services as a
function of the volume of banking services (Q), the price of inputs (wage
rate, price of physical capital and deposit rate), and the output times the
rst derivative of the demand function. The estimated coe¢ cients of wages
of bank employees, interest rate on deposits (r), and price of physical capital
should be positive showing that higher costs will be passed on to consumers
in the form of higher price of loans. The coe¢ cient on output times the
inverse of the rst derivative of the demand function is the parameter of
interest in this exercise. It gives a measure of competition on the banking
sector.
We estimate equations (10) and (11) and the outputs are reported in
the Table 5 below.23 Given that P (an endogenous variable in the supply
equation) appears as a regressor in the demand equation (10) and likewise
Q (endogenous) appears as a regressor in the supply equation, we have a
(possible) simultaneity problem. In this case, estimating by OLS may result
22Bikker & Haaf (2002) also used GDP as a proxy for disposable income.
23The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test identied that each variable is integrated at the
rst di¤erence, with unit roots at the levels. The Pesaran-Shin-Smith ARDL showed a
unique long-run relationship, allowing the conduct variable to be interpreted as if no time
series characteristics exist.
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in inconsistent and/or ine¢ cient estimates for at least two reasons: First,
one or more of the endogenous variables may be correlated with the error
term and second, the error terms may themselves be correlated. We ran
some endogeneity tests - specically the Hausman test and the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test. The test results suggest no endogeneity. However, the
identication conditions for the conduct parameter (a3 6= 0 and/or a5 6= 0)
are only marginally met. The joint test of a3 = a5 = 0 cannot be rejected
at the 10% level. However, individual tests show that a3 = 0 is rejected
at the 10% level (but not at the 5% level) while a5 = 0 cannot be rejected
at the 10% level. Given these weak identication results and our intuition
on the equilibrium relationship between demand and supply, we proceeded
to estimate the demand and supply equations simultaneously using a SAS
programme.
Table 5 about here.
For the demand equation, GDP is positive and signicant at the 1% level
while the government rate (Govt_r) is only signicant at the 10% level, but
carries the correct (negative) sign. Price carries the correct (negative) sign
but is insignicant. The coe¢ cients on the interaction terms PGovt_r and
PGDP , are insignicant at the 10% level.
In the supply equation, the input price coe¢ cients carry the expected
(positive) signs suggesting that higher prices of inputs raises the price of
loans. However, only two coe¢ cients are signicant: wages are signicant
at the 10% level while price of capital is signicant at the 1% level.
The parameter of interest in this exercise is the coe¢ cient of the conduct
variable,  . The estimation yields  equal to 0.2, with a t-statistic of -
0.08. The  statistic is thus insignicant implying that the coe¢ cient is
statistically equal to zero.24 This insignicant coe¢ cient means that   0;
and that according to the Bresnahan model, perfect competition cannot be
rejected in the South African banking sector. This however does not imply
competitive conduct by the South African banks as failure to reject perfect
24This insignicant coe¢ cient does not seem to be a problem as the output for the
Bresnahan model in Sha¤er (1989) on the U.S banking sector, and the  coe¢ cients of all
of the countries in Bikker & Haaf (2002) are also insignicant.
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competition does not mean acceptance of competition or evidence of no
market power.25
The results of the Bresnahan model should be interpreted with caution
for a number of reasons. Among these are that the data are generally impre-
cise and fraught with measurement errors and our sample is too short. In
addition, the Bresnahan methodology appears to have weak discriminating
power in practice.
5 Comparison with other Developing Countries
Many studies have been conducted using di¤erent methods to nd the level
of competition in the banking sectors of numerous countries across the world.
The two main approaches used are the two methods applied in this paper,
the Panzar and Rosse approach and the Bresnahan model.26
Perera et al. (2006) have used the Panzar and Rosse approach on some
developing Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. Claessens & Laeven (2003) have conducted the Panzar and Rosse
approach on fty countries around the world, of which thirty one are devel-
oping countries. The results of the Panzar and Rosse H -statistics from the
developing countries of these two papers are shown in Table A in Appendix
I. Recently, Bikker et al (2012) use a much larger sample to estimate the
H -statistics for di¤erent countries developing and developed. They nd
an H -statistic of 0.46 for South Africa.
The countries that are most comparable to South Africa in terms of their
level of development include Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Turkey. The H -
statistics for these range between 0.21 for Chile to 0.61 for Turkey. These
results suggest that these ve countries all have low to moderate level of
competition in their respective banking sectors.
These results are however markedly di¤erent to those of Claessens &
Laeven (2003) and earlier studies who estimate a scaled revenue equation.
25The authors thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this observation to us.
26Generally, the results of the Bresnahan approach are less robust than those of the
Panzar-Rosse model, largely due to measurement errors in variables and weak discrimi-
nating power.
22
For instance, Claessens & Laeven (2003) nd an H -statistic of 0.85 for South
Africa, and fairly high H -values for Chile, Argentina and Brazil (0.66, 0.73
and 0.83 respectively), but a moderate H -value for Turkey (0.46).
6 Conclusion
Given the importance of the banking sector on the economic perfor-
mance of any modern economy, it is imperative that the banking sector is
competitive. This will help improve the e¢ ciency required to create a fully
functional credit system as well as strengthen the e¤ectiveness of monetary
policy.
This paper has used two models to test for the level of competition in
the South African banking sector. The Panzar and Rosse model suggests
imperfect competition in the South African banking sector while the Bres-
nahan model fails to reject perfect competition. These two non-structural
models have been used extensively in the literature and hold a high level
of credibility in giving an accurate result for the level of competition. The
results of the models combined with support from other recent applications
of these models, as well as the similar results for comparable developing
countries, strongly suggests monopolistic competition in the South African
banking sector.
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Appendix I: Tables
TABLE 1 - Key Banking Values as a Percentage of GDP
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total Depositsa 72% 74% 80% 88% 93%
Loans to Public Sectora 6% 5% 5% 4% 3%
Loans to Private Sectora 58% 61% 67% 76% 81%
a As a percentage of GDP.
Source: The South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin - Money and
Banking
TABLE 2 - Market Share by Deposits
Bank Total Deposits (R million) % of Industry Deposits
Standard Bank 705,843 36%
Firstrand 416,507 21%
Nedbank 384,541 19%
ABSA 368,545 19%
Other Banks 96,242 5%
TABLE 3 - Market Share by Total Assets
Bank Total Assets (R million) % of Industry Assets
Standard Bank 1,175,409 36%
Firstrand 717,257 22%
Nedbank 483,609 14%
ABSA 640,608 19%
Other Banks 290,227 9%
1
1 
 
Table 4a: Regression output for the Panzar-Rosse methodology: independent variables not corrected 
for scale (i.e., impact of total assets on independent variables not corrected for). 
 
(Using Total Interest Income as dependent variable) 
Variable 
 
Regression1
1
 
 
  
AFR -0.135 
 
(-0.71) 
PPE 0.500** 
 
(2.21) 
PCE 0.322*** 
 
(3.06) 
BSF-Equity -0.802*** 
 
(-2.67) 
BSF-Loans 0.538*** 
 
(3.18) 
OI -0.629*** 
 
(-2.73) 
Constant 13.930*** 
 
(16.27) 
  Wald chi2(6) 256.72 
Prob >chi2 0.0000 
H-statistic 0.6865 
Obs. 108 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Regression output for the Panzar-Rosse methodology: independent variables corrected for 
scale (i.e., impact of total assets on independent variables corrected for). 
(Using Total Interest Income as dependent variable) 
 
Variable 
 
Regression2 
 
  
AFR 0.052 
 
(0.26) 
PPE 0.711** 
 
(2.45) 
PCE -0.236* 
 
(-1.87) 
BSF-Equity 0.411 
 
(-1.47) 
BSF-Loans 0.166 
 
(0.84) 
                                                          
1
 Independent variables not corrected for scale – i.e., impact of total assets on independent variables not 
corrected for. 
2 
 
OI -0.843*** 
 
(-4.02) 
Constant 14.413*** 
 
(105.31) 
  Wald chi2(6) 38.20 
Prob >chi2 0.0000 
H-statistic 0.5281 
Obs. 108 
 
 
 
Table 5: Bresnahan Model Parameter Estimates 
   
 
 Three factor Model  
  
 
 
Parameter 
 
Estimate 
   
P 
 
-3.292 
  
 
(-0.60) 
Gdp 
 
1.959*** 
  
 
-8.47 
Pgdp 
 
0.000004 
  
 
-0.97 
Gvt_r 
 
-0.022* 
  
 
(-1.72) 
Pgvt 
 
-0.014 
  
 
(-0.09) 
Constant1 
 
-6.157* 
  
 
(-1.87) 
TA 
 
0.083 
  
 
-0.11 
r 
 
0.002 
  
 
-1.52 
wage 
 
0.001* 
  
 
-1.77 
Pce 
 
37.890*** 
  
 
-4.67 
Constant2 
 
-0.488 
  
 
(-1.45) 
Lambda 
 
-0.218 
  
 
(-0.08) 
R2(1) 
 
0.97 
R2(2) 
 
0.54 
 
3 
 
Notes:  the variable abbreviations are based on equations 10 and 11. R
2
(1) is the R-squared for the demand function and R
2
(2) 
is the R-squared for the supply function. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
LogTotal Assets 68 20.53 0.42 19.92 21.26 
LogGDP_2000 68 13.75 0.17 13.51 14.06 
P 68 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.12 
Pk 68 0.002 0.0005 0.001 0.003 
Inflation 68 7.25 3.42 0.45 15.95 
MM_r 68 11.26 3.24 6.53 20.53 
Govt_r 68 12.33 3.07 7.33 17.05 
r 68 11.07 3.18 5.91 19.85 
Log of Wage 68 15.92 0.47 14.46 16.89 
Intr 114 0.13 0.15 0 0.78 
AFR 114 0.12 0.13 0 1.04 
PPE 114 0.03 0.04 0 0.23 
PCE 114 0.69 1.33 -1.01 12.09 
OI 114 0.07 0.08 0 0.28 
BSFEQ 114 0.21 0.27 0.03 1.17 
BSFLO 114 0.31 0.25 0 0.85 
 
Appendix II: List of H-statistics
TABLE A - H -statistics from Claessens & Laeven (2003)
Country H-statistic Country H-statistic
Argentina 0.73 Malaysia 0.68
Bangladesh 0.69 Mexico 0.78
Brazil 0.83 Nigeria 0.67
Chile 0.66 Pakistan 0.48
Colombia 0.66 Panama 0.74
Costa Rica 0.92 Paraguay 0.60
Croatia 0.56 Peru 0.72
Dominican Republic 0.72 Philippines 0.66
Ecuador 0.68 Poland 0.77
Honduras 0.81 Russia 0.54
Hungary 0.75 South Africa 0.85
Indiaa 0.64 Sri Lankaa 0.71
Indonesia 0.62 Turkey 0.46
Kenya 0.58 Ukraine 0.68
Latvia 0.66 Venezuela 0.74
Lebanon 0.69
a H -statistics from Perera et al. (2006).
1
